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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BONNYE V. HOOPER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORA-
TION, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Civil 
No. 7887 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's statement of facts is so brief as to be 
of little value to the court in its consideration of the law 
points involved in the appeal. On the main point in 
issue it is contradictory. On the first page of the brief 
they state that the left rear wheel on the truck was 
defectively manufactured. On page 6 they state that 
there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether or not 
the left rear wheel was defective and as to whether or 
not the defect caused the accident in question. Viewing 
the evidence most favorably from plaintiff's side, there 
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-was a conflict but the jury decided that issue against 
plaintiff's contention, so on this appeal we must consider 
the evidence as havjng established the fact that it was 
not defectively manufactured by defendant, and the only 
questions on this appeal are as to whether the trial court 
committed prejudicial error in its instructions to the 
jury and in its rulings as to the admissibility of the 
evidence submitted to the jury. The weight of the evi-
dence to sustain the jury finding is not raised by the 
appeal. 
In order to understand the rulings it is important 
to know the issues raised by the pleadings and the 
theories upon which the case was tried by the parties. 
The following facts are not in dispute : 
Plaintiff and Beverly Hooper, son of plaintiff, pur-
chased the truck in question from Hyland Motor Com-
pany, Ely, Nevada, on July 21, 1951 (R. 120); it was a 
new truck manufactured or assembled by defendant; it 
had been driven a little over 6700 miles at the time of 
the accident; the accident happened on the evening of 
October 15, 1951 on Newark Valley Highway, a graveled 
road, while plaintiff was driving in a southwesterly 
direction about six or seven miles north of the inter-
section with U. S. Highway 50. Plaintiff was alone in 
the truck at the time of the accident; the truck rolled 
over two times, pinning plaintiff's foot beneath the upset 
vehicle, where she remained until discovered by a Mrs. 
Stinnett, who summoned help from a group of men who 
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were playing cards at her home (R. 145); when they 
arrived the truck was facing nortlnn\sterly on the high-
way (the opposite direction from that in which it was 
travelling before the accident) (R. 147), and was badly 
damaged. The extent and character of the car damage, 
the physical characteristics of the highway near the scene 
of the accident, and the marks on and off the highway 
made by the truck prior to the upset, as testified to by 
those who saw them, were the main elements from which 
the expert witnesses for plaintiff and defendant gave 
their opinions as to what did or did not occur prior to 
and in the accident and as to what was the condition of 
the wheel before the accident. Those facts ·will be more 
fully discussed in considering the alleged errors. 
Plaintiff's theory, as set forth in the complaint, was 
that the left rear wheel was weak, inadequate and defec-
tive when manufactured by defendant and put on the 
market, and that it should have discovered such fact by 
proper inspection (R. 2). By interrogatory 1 (R. 8) 
plaintiff was requested to set forth the particular defects 
that were claimed and she answered (R. 10) that she 
claimed improper design of the wheel, defective work-
manship, improperly installed rivets, improper rivet 
holes, defective materials, missing rivets, loose rivets 
and rivets of improper quality. Those broad issues were 
further reduced and limited by the evidence as actua11y 
presented in the testimony of Mr. Curtis, an expert 
witness, who asserted there were physical facts on the 
rim which indicated the presence of three loose rivets 
- before the accident, which, in his opinion, caused the 
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accident (R. 185). Defendant denied this and presented 
what the jury believed to be the correct explanation of 
the accident. 
Plaintiff testified that she left the ranch at 6 :05 on 
the evening of October 15, 1951 (R. 121) to go to Eureka, 
Nevada, to attend Lodge and pick up some grain and 
groceries. It was not yet dark. About eight miles from 
the ranch she turned on the headlights. She was driving 
southerly on the Newark Valley Highway in the center 
of the road (R. 122). About seven miles north of the 
junction of the road with U. S. Highway 50 she passed 
a large mountain lion and she says, ''I told the mountain 
lion not for it to be there when I came back, because if 
I happened to have a flat tire on the trip, I wouldn't 
like to be changing it around him." She had just gone 
a short distance past the lion when she said the left rear 
end of the pickup dropped suddenly, down, and it 
swerved to the left and she tried to right it to the right 
and it went end for end, and it seemed to be somewhat 
going to the right front of the fender, when it went over. 
She said she was travelling in the center of the road 
at the time (R. 122). Up to that time she noticeclnothing 
unusual or wrong with the truck (R. 123). She said she 
was driving at about 30 miles per hour (R. 127); that 
the truck did not go off the left side of the road after 
it dropped down and swerved to the left (R. 127); she 
couldn't tell in inches how far it dropped but it was 
greater than a flat tire (R. 141). The rear end pulled to 
the left (R. 142). She turned the steering wheel to the 
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right: and it ,\·n~ tlwn that thl' trurk startc'd tippiuo-~ b 
over (R. 143) and skidded along the highway on its side. 
Plaintiff called witnesses Beverly Hooper and Dan 
Milovich, both of whom testified as to the physical facts 
and the marks on the highway as they found them when 
they '?isited the scene of the accident that night or the 
next day. They both testified as to the nature of the 
damage to the truck, particularly as to the condition of 
the left rear wheel, the spider and the rim, the rivets 
and the fact that after the truck had been moved off the 
highway the rim was separated from the spider. 
Beverly Hooper testified that he visited the scene of 
the accident the afternoon of the next day. The truc-k 
was still where it had been left by Mr. Stinnett, Toad 
Rice, Lloyd Rickets, Ray Starling and Dan Milovich 
when they moved it off the center of the highway the 
night before (R. 63). The spider or inside of the wheel 
was still bolted to the hub ; the tire and rim were in the 
back of the truck. He identified the spider Exhibit "A", 
rim Exhibit '' B'' and tire Exhibit '' C' ', and they were 
received in evidence. He removed the spider from the 
drum. All of the nuts were tight. He looked inside the 
rim and saw the worn, shiny spots that are there (R. 67). 
All of the windows in the truck were broken except one 
small pane on the right door, the right fender was 
smashed inwards and backwards ; the hood was smashed; 
the top of the cab was smashed; the left door was smashed 
back out and around; the frame on the left side was bent 
quite badly under the cab (R. 68). The shock absorber 
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-----------------.._ .. 
housing was scarred and marked up; the shock absorber 
hanger was bent upwards; the main leaf of the left rear 
spring was bent up; and there were scars on the spring 
front and back (R. 63). See Exhibits "D" and "E" 
(photographs). There was a tire mark on the back inside 
of the left rear fender (R. 70). See Ex. "G". 
The tire (Ex. C) was never dismounted from the rim 
(Ex. B) until they were dismounted in December of 1951 
(R. 92). There was a tear in the tube about six to eight 
inches from the valve stem just above the bent place on 
the rim. The tear did not go through (R. 95). He did 
not observe any heads of rivets inside the tire (R. 95). 
After the accident both the rim and spider were 
distorted and separated from each other ( R. 67). There 
was a dent in the outside of the rim and there were bends 
on the inside (R. 67). The spider (center of the wheel) 
was still on the truck but was distorted (Ex. "A") near 
the scarring or scuffed portion (R. 218-220). 
The tire on the left rear wheel was blown out and 
flat (R. 267). 
The truck had had extensive use since its purchase: 
from the ranch to Eureka (R. 86-87); to Los Angeles (R. 
87); from the ranch to the McDougall ranch (R. 87); 
hauling horses (R. 88); between the ranch and the top 
of the field (R. 89) ; had been equipped with a hitch to 
draw a horse trailer (R. 96); and had been used to haul 
deer hunters to the hunting ground (R. 96). 
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~·-
Several \vitnesses testified as to the marks on and 
off the highway after the accident. One of them was a 
1\Ir. Stinnett (one of the men summoned for help by Mrs. 
Stinnett after the accident and who was brought to Salt 
Lake City as a ·witness for plaintiff, but not called by 
her and then called as a witness for defendant). He saw 
the tracks made by the truck immediately after the acci-
dent and said they were off the crown of the road on the 
east side (R. 25 7-258) extending north from a point 
about 50 feet from "·here the truck came back on the 
road and overturned. He marked the tracks on Exhibit 
7 and identified the location on the photograph Exhibit 
"1" where the stake is on the photograph, as the place 
where the truck came back on the highway (R. 259). The 
mark off the highway was about 30 feet long. It was a 
fresh mark and led to the place where the truck came 
back on the road and over-turned (R. 250). He testified 
that when the four men were pulling the truck up the 
highway to the cut to the north after the accident to get 
it off the road that they did not get over near the right 
(east) shoulder (R. 266). "We pulled the pickup right 
on the gravel road.'' (R. 266). The track off the road 
was not made by the spider (R. 268). The fill is about 
45° slope (R. 269) and about 3 feet to the ground level. 
The mark was about a foot below the crown of the 
highway (R. 270). He saw no other tracks than the one 
off the road and the one they made up the road when 
they pulled the truck. 
~1 A photograph of the fill at this point (Ex. "1") was 
introduced in evidence. It shows the nature of the fill 
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material as containing rocks and boulders. The fill 
material obviously came from the cut, as is usual in road 
construction. Beverly Hooper also identified the area 
and testified that the rocks and boulders shown in the 
photograph are there and might have rolled off as the 
work of making the fill was being done. (R. 106-107). 
rrhe spider and rim are the two component parts of 
the wheel. Both were manufactured for defendant by 
Norse Thermidor Company. The spider is the central 
part and takes the place of spokes. By great pressure 
the spider is forced inside the rim, after which four sets 
of rivets, in groups of three, are inserted in holes which 
have been punched in the rim and tire combination in 
one process (R. 289-291). In punching the holes for the 
rivets the direction is from the rim into the spider so 
that th~ edge of rim hole forms a cone and flows down 
into the hole in the spider (R. 337). The rivet is then 
inserted, cold, and in one operation the rivet expands to 
fill the hole (R. 295,310, 335) and forms the head for the 
rivet flush with the rim surface (R. 323). 
After the accident in which the spider and rim were 
separated, all of the rivets were found sheared off or 
pulled through, and both the rim and spider were dis-
torted and bent. One set of three rivets at the place 
where the rim was bent and where the tire was torn are 
the particular ones about which the expert witnesses for 
both parties testified. At those three rivet holes on the 
inside of the rim, where the heads of the rivets were 
formed, there were three shiny spots. Mr. Curtis, a 
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. ,, 
witness for plaintiff testified that in his opinion those 
shiny spots indicated to him that those three rivets were 
loose prior to the accident (H. 185); that thereby the 
load or burden of the entire wheel was shifted to the 
other rivets, causing them to shear and the wheel to fail 
prior to the upset of the truck ( R. 185). On the other 
hand, the witnesses for defendant testified that the 
separation was caused by a heavy blow, sufficient to 
distort the rim and spider, shear the rivets, and pull the 
three rivets through the metal, causing the shiny spots 
in the rim; that it was a physical impossibility for the 
spider and rim to separate with all but three sets of 
riYets holding and with one set of rivets either loose or 
entirely absent; that this would be particularly true if 
the truck were being driven down a highway at 30 miles 
per hour; that the three or four rivet holes in the spider 
and rim at the places where the shiny spots appear on 
the rim show that they were expanded with the rivets in 
the riveting process and were tight (R. 336-339). If the 
rivets were loose there would be no expansion of the 
rivet holes. There could be a loose rivet only if no heads 
were formed on the rivets and the heads of the rivets 
are formed only after expansion of the rivet to the full 
measure of the hole and expanding the hole (R. 341) ; 
that separation of the rim from the spider could not 
cause the left rear of the truck to drop as much as a fiat 
tirP (R. 394); that the fact of distortion of the rim and 
spider shows the rivets were present and tight or there 
could have been no distortion (R. 379-380). Sufficient 
force to cause the distortion had to come through the 
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rivets. The force which caused the distortion was applied 
to the outside of the tire and rim. The blow that caused 
the distortion and separation occurred in the accident 
(R. 385, 362-363) when the truck tipped over or by 
striking a boulder in the fill. That it is logical, from the 
nature of the damage to the truck, that if the driver 
( I\Irs. Hooper) got the left rear wheel off the road and 
in the attempt to get it back slid around sideways, strik-
ing a rock or boulder off the edge of the road, which 
broke the wheel, it would explain the nature of the 
damage to the truck after the tip-over (R. 391). That 
if the left rear end of the truck went down it would have 
a braking effect and turn the front of the truck to the 
left (R. 363-364). Something else had to happen to cause 
the truck to tip over in the direction indicated by the 
truck damage ( R. 365). 
Dr. FrankS. Harris, Assistant Professor of Physics 
at the University of Utah, stated that if the truck were 
being driven on the highway at 30 miles per hour there 
would be no separation of the rim and spider, if the 
three rivets were loose or missing or even if only one 
set of rivets remained so long as the truck was being 
driven straight down the road (R. 408-9). To cause the 
separation the rivets had to shear, overcome the press 
fit, plus the cone effect of the rivet holes. To cause that 
a considerable side force would have to be applied. When 
a car is going down the road the forces are very small. 
There has to be a side force or a sudden speed up or 
slow down to cause a shearing (R. 409). 
10 
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:)lr. Hooper testified the wheel was in good condition 
prior to the accident. (R. 67). 
The numerous inspections, visual and mechanical 
by both X orse Thermidor and defendant were given in 
evidence and were more than ordinary. _Many of them 
were l005"c. \Ye will not detail this evidence because it 
is undisputed and no point is being made by appellants 
that it was insufficient. 
We trust that this more adequate case background 
will enable the Court to more fully understand and 
evaluate the rulings of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
WAS CORRECT AND WAS XOT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR. 
For convenience of the court we restate the In-
struction: 
"You are instructed that the fact that the rim 
and spider were found in a separated condition 
after the accident is no evidence of the fact that 
they were defective, unsound or unsafe when 
assembled and sold by defendant, General Motors 
Corporation, nor is it evidence of the fact that 
the separating of the rim and spider caused the 
truck to go out of control and over turn.'' 
The effect of the instruction was that the fact of 
separation after the accident was no evidence of: (a) 
11 
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that they were defective when assembled and sold by 
defendant; nor (b) that the separation caused the truck 
to go out of control and over-turn. 
In other words, those two elements had to be estab-
lished by evidence other than the fact of separation. 
rrhe fact of separation after the accident was un-
disputed. Plaintiff was not deprived of the benefit of 
this evidence for all that it properly meant, and it was 
fully discussed and considered by all of the witnesses 
for plaintiff and defendant. The conclusions and infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom in the light of other factors 
were fully considered and discussed by the expert wit-
nesses. The jury was instructed that they should con-
sider all the evidence and weigh the evidence carefully 
and consider it together, and give such weight to in-
ferences from the facts proven as they should think 
they are entitled to (R. 43). 
That the fact of separation after the accident was 
no evidence of its condition at the time o{ assembly and 
sale by defendant is self-evident. They were no longer 
in the same condition as when assembled and sold; they 
had just come out of a truck that was almost completely 
wrecked; and bore evidence of having received a heavy 
blow or blows sufficient to materially distort both the 
rim and spider. It makes no difference whether the dis-
tortion and shearing occurred as claimed by plaintiff or 
or as claimed by defendant, the fact remains that the 
condition of separation after the accident was no evidence 
as to its condition at the time of assembly and sale. 
12 
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Plaintiff, herself, produced evidence to the contrary. 
Her son testified as to the use of the truck, his numerous 
inspections immediately prior to the accident and that 
the wheel was in good condition (R. 67). 
In arguing this point counsel for plaintiff are 
attempting to read into it something that is not there, 
viz., that the fact of separation was not to be considered 
by the jury for any purpose. The instruction says no 
such thing. It expressly says that the fact of separation 
was no evidence as to its condition at the time of sale 
nor as to the cause of the overturning of the vehicle. In 
other words, the fact of separation would not in and of 
itself permit an inference of either of those factors. It 
was the instruction the court adopted for telling the 
jury that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply 
to those two issues. 
After the accident the truck was in a damaged con-
dition and the wheel so severely wrecked that it was no 
longer evidence as to its condition before the accident. 
The issues were: What caused it to be in that con-
dition 1 When did the separation occur~ Did the separa-
tion occur before the truck upset or did it occur in the 
events involved in the accident 1 
t; Those issues were all fully covered by the evidence, 
·:( argued to the jury by counsel and submitted to the jury ,,
~~ for its determination. The instruction in question took 
~-: nothing from those issues to which plaintiff was properly 
,.i' entitled. 
13 
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rrhere is no longer any doubt in this State that a 
manufacturer may be held liable for negligence in the 
manufacture or assembling of the vital parts of an auto-
mobile. However, no court, so far as we are aware, has 
said that the manufacturer is an insurer, that the doc-
trine of 1·es ipsa loquitur applies, or that there is an 
inference to be drawn from the fact of the accident in 
and of itself as to the cause of the accident or as to pre-
existing condition. Those things must be established, as 
in other negligence cases, by independent evidence from 
which the jury may determine whether the result (in 
this case the separation of the rim from the spider) 
was also the cause; whether the result was due to negli-
gent manufacturing or whether the result was due to 
the events involved in the accident, for which defendant 
has no responsibility. If there are cases changing the 
ordinary rules so as to make a different rule applicable 
to manufacturers, we have failed to find such authority. 
It seems to us, from a reading of their brief, that 
counsel is in effect contending for some application of 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to this type of case from 
which such an inference might arise from the fact of 
separation, or are contending for a doctrine that proof 
of a condition after the instrumentality has been dam-
aged and the condition entirely changed, as it admittedly 
was in this case, is evidence as to its condition prior to 
the accident, when according to their own evidence it was 
in good condition. In both theories they are in error. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only in 
cases where the instrumentality causing the injury was 
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under the exclusive control of defendant, which this 
truck was not. It was in the exclusin.' control of plaintiff 
and had been in the exrlnsive control of plaintiff and 
her son since its purchase and it had been driven ex-
tensively. 
There are a few cases holding that the doctrine 
applies in the enclosed container cases and many holding 
that it does not, and this Court has recently held that it 
does not apply even in those cases where the evidence 
shows that others have had the opportunity of changing 
or tampering with the condition. Jordan vs. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., ______ Ut. ______ , 218 Pac. (2) 660. 
In the above case this court recognized the rule that 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may apply in "sealed 
container'' cases as an exception to the rule requiring 
exclusive control of the instrumentality. However, it 
refused to apply the rule where there was evidence of 
an opportunity for tampering by others. In doing so it 
used the following language: 
"In other words, the only time that the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur should apply to a 'sealed 
product' in the latter category is when the plain-
tiff has shou:n that there was an absence of op-
portunity for tampering so that in effect the court 
could conclude that there was extended control 
over the product by the manufacturer until it 
reached the ultimate consumer, or where the 
product passes directly from the manufacturer to 
the consumer, without passing through inter-
mediate hands.'' 
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In the case at bar plaintiff had had exclusive control 
of the truck for approximately three months and driven 
the truck extensively for more than 6700 miles and the 
accident had intervened so the condition after the acci-
dent could not be evidence under the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur or under any other doctrine as to its con-
dition at the time of manufacture and sale by defendant 
or as to the cause of the accident. 
This doctrine has been announced by this court in 
a long line of decisions from Quinn vs. Utah Gas and 
Coke Company, 42 Ut. 113, 129 Pac. 362 to and including 
Jensen vs. Kresse, 87 Ut. 434, 49 Pac. (2) 958. 
In all other cases the plaintiff must rely, not on an 
inference from the fact of injury or damage, not on the 
fact of the accident itself, but upon independent evidence 
of facts from which negligence may be established or 
inferred. The inference does not come from the event 
or incident itself in cases where the doctrine does not 
apply. This is particularly true when the~uted evi-
dence shows that the condition has been changed in the 
accident, itself. It would be an anomoly in the law to 
hold that a changed condition after the instrumentality 
had been long in the control of others and had been 
damaged by their operation, was evidence of a condition 
long before the change, and permit an inference to be 
drawn therefrom. 
Courts have almost uniformly used and approved 
this type of instruction in telling the jury that no such 
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inference exists and that the issue of negligence must 
be established by other evidence. 
This Court in :Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Ut. 139, 122 
Pac. (:2) 191, adopted that doetrine in the following 
language: 
''There is no presumption of negligence simply 
because an accident happened. In this case, 
negligence may not be presumed from the direc-
tion and distance of the tire marks of the respec-
tive vehicles as they approached the point of 
contact. The oral evidence of time, place, distances 
and circumstances were aids in interpreting the 
mute marks of the tires of the respective 
vehicles. ' ' 
The above law found expression In an instruction 
very similar to the language used in this case at bar, 
in Nahorski vs. St. Louis Elec. Term. Ry. Co., (Mo.), 
272 S. W. 1025 where the following instruction was given: 
"The court instructs the jury that the fact that 
the truck and street car came together is no evi-
dence of negligence on the part of either the 
plaintiff, the driver, or the defendant, but that 
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant was negligent as set out in the other 
instructions ; and unless you so find your verdict 
must be for the defendant.'' 
In a very recent case (1950) this law was applied 
to a state of facts not substantially different from those 
in this case. It too was a manufacturers' liability case 
r.- in which it was sought to hold General Motors liable for 
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------... 
putting out a truck with a defective sleeve in the differ-
ential as a result of which it was claimed the car went 
out of control and smashed into a building. Plaintiff 
proved that the sleeve was broken after the accident. 
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, Western District, reversed the 
case and directed judgment for defendant on the ground 
that there was no evidence of negligence. Fisher et ux 
vs. Sheppard et al, G.M.C. Truck & Coach Div., General 
Motors Corp., 77 Atl. (2) 417. The truck driver testified 
that he was driving on a hill when he heard a grinding 
noise near the transmission and the vehicle slipped out 
of gear. He applied the brakes but had insufficient air 
to stop. Being unable to control the truck he crashed 
into the building. As to any inference that might arise 
from the fact that the sleeve was found to be broken 
after the accident, the court said: 
"The theory of negligence appears to be that, 
notwithstanding a successful shift by Sheppard, a 
defective sleeve in the differential broke causing 
the gear to slip out and there was not sufficient 
air pressure remaining to force the gear back 
into proper position. The basis of the entire 
theory is proof of a defective sleeve. 
(Proof of Prior Defect) 
"We are of opinion that the evidence is not suf-
ficient to establish this basic fact. Certainly, proof 
of a broken sleeve itself, in the circumstances here 
presented, will not support a finding that it was 
defective prior to the collision of the tractor with 
the Fisher building. A finding that the break 
resulted from the terrific impact is equally prob-
able. Where two conclusions can be had from 
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given circumstances, one of which would create 
liability and the other negative liability, a jury 
may not be permitted to indulge in conjecture and 
negligence cannot be predicated thereon.'' 
There, as here, there was no inference from the 
fact that the condition existed after the accident. In 
the case at bar .Jlr. Curtis testified that in his opinion 
the separation occurred immediately before the accident 
(R. 186) and the witnesses for defendant testified that 
the separation occurred from a heavy blow on the rim 
in the accident (R. 362, 363). There was no inference 
in favor of either party. The jury saw fit to believe the 
evidence submitted by defendant. No one testified as ,to 
the condition of the wheel when sold, but defendant 
produced abundant evidence as to the method of manu-
facture, inspections during manufacture, and inspections 
after manufacture and when being assembled and put 
on the truck which completely negatived the inference 
that a wheel with loose rivets could get by either at the 
manufacturer's plant or the defendant's plant. (R. 292, 
294, 295, 300, 317, 318, 319, 325, 326). The most that can 
be said on this point is that there was a conflict in the 
evidence which the jury resolved against plaintiff. 
In Sennett vs. Noramtum. Coal Co., (Mass.), 187 N. 
E. 758, plaintiff sought to recover damages by reason 
of a wheel coming off a truck because of a broken axle. 
The axle broke because of crystallization. Plaintiff 
sought to recover on the theory of negligence and the 
court announced the general principle that the hap-
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pening of the accident under those circumstances did 
not indicate negligence. 
A similar principle was announced by the :Massachu-
setts Supreme Court in McCabe vs. Boston Consolidated 
Gas Company, 50 N. E. (2) 640 wherein it was sought to 
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to an injury 
received as a result of a claimed defect in a stove which 
had been in the exclusive control and operation of the 
plaintiff. Under those circumstances the court held that 
the happening of the accident did not warrant inference 
of negligence and the doctrine does not apply. We quote 
as follows: 
"In this case it cannot be said that res ipsa loqui-
tur. The situation was not in the exclusive con-
trol of the defendant. The characteristics of the 
stove were determined by its manufacturer, and 
its operation was in the control of the plaintiff. 
Under these circumstances the mere happening of 
the accident does not warrant an inference that 
it was caused by negligence of the defendant." 
Brooks vs. Hill-Shaw Co., 117 Fed. (2) 682. The 
action was brought for personal injury sustained when 
a glass coffee maker filled with boiling water and coffee 
broke and injured plaintiff. She sued the manufacturer, 
claiming that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied 
and sought to make an inference of negligence from the 
happening of the accident itself. The circuit court of 
appeals of the Seventh Circuit in this case, decided in 
1941, denied recovery and in doing so used the following 
language: 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"\Ye agree with appellee that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur is not applicable to the facts here 
presented. • \Yhen a thing which causes injury, 
without fault of the injured person, is shown to 
be under the exclusin.' control of the defendant, 
and the injury is such as, in the ordinary course 
of things, does not occur if the one having such 
control uses proper care, it affords reasonable 
evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that 
the injury arose from the defendant's want of 
care.' San Juan Light Co. Y. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 
32 S. Ct. 399, 401, 56 L.Ed. 680. We think this may 
not be invoked to take the place of proof of a p-
pellant 's charge of negligence. Here we have a 
utensil which had been used before-even if it 
were the new one appellant received two days 
before, the eYidence ·was that she had used it 
several times. While she testified that she had 
used the new one 'two or three times,' she also 
testified that she used each one on an average of 
five or six times a day. However, there was a 
complete absence of proof that it was the new one 
which broke. Appellant said she had no way of 
telling. HoweYer, from our own examination of 
the rubber gasket enclosing the fragments of the 
neck of the flask, it is obvious that that gasket 
had been in use many times, and was not a new 
one furnished two days before the accident. Ap-
pellant testified that she had used two of the 
coffee makers for over eight months, and the other 
two for over four months. During that time the 
utensils were under her management and control, 
and appellee had absolutely nothing to do with 
them. 
"However, appellant argues that the instrumen-
tality was under the sole management and control 
of appellee at the time the alleged negligence 
occurred, namely, when it was being constructed-
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'{ 
that her charge is of negligence in the construc-
tion so that the utensil was unable to withstand 
the heat to which it had to be subjected in the 
normal use of it. We think this is negatived by 
appellant's own testimony that it had withstood 
the heat at least two or three times, and more 
likely, over three hundred times. This being the 
case, the thing does not speak for itself, amd 
appellarnt must bring in proof of her charge of 
negligence. It may be that the glass was defec-
tive, and that such defect did not immediately 
disclose itself. If so, it was a matter of proof, 
not of presumption." 
Oklahoma Tire and Supply Co. vs. Williams, et al., 
181 Fed. ( 2) 675. This was an action against the seller 
of an allegedly defective kerosene stove to recover for 
injuries sustained when flames came from the oven of 
the stove, injuring plaintiff and damaging the dwelling. 
Plaintiff claimed in that case that the fact of the accident 
was substantial evidence from which it could be inferred 
that the stove was defective. Reversing a judgment for 
plaintiff, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the 8th Circuit 
in 1950 announced the law as follows: 
''But our study of the record has not disclosed 
any substantial evidence to show that there was 
such a leak. The court rightly declared that the 
case was not one in which the alleged negligence 
of the defendant, i.e., sale of a defective leaking 
stove, could be inferred from the occurrence of 
the fire. The stove was long in the sole possession 
and use of the plain tiffs and the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur was not applicable or sought to be 
invoked. The court rightly recognized that the 
burden of proof was on the plaintiffs to establish 
the charge that the stove ·leaked by evidence.'' 
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Rotche vs. Buick Motor Company, (Ill.), 193 N. E. 
529. This was an action for personal injuries to the 
operator of an automobile who claimed that while he 
was running his automobile at 30 miles per hour, that 
the same left the roadway, struck and damaged a con-
crete culvert, turned over. After the accident it was 
found that the right front tire and the left front wheel 
were destroyed, the rear axle was bent and the top and 
sides of the body were damaged, and a clevis connecting 
a cable with the left front wheel was missing. It was 
claimed that while operating the car he applied the foot 
brake, which failed to work, and that this occurred by 
reason of a defective brake. In that case, as here, he 
testified that prior to the accident he experienced no 
trouble with the brakes, although he had driven his car 
600 miles. In that case they claimed, as here, that an 
inference of negligence might be drawn from the fact of 
the accident. The Supreme Court of lllinois refused to 
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and particularly 
stated that the condition of the car after the wreck was 
no evidence as to its condition prior to the wreck. We 
quote as follows : 
''The mere fact that an accident resulting in an 
injury to a person or in damage to property has 
occurred does not authorize a presumption or 
inference that the defendant was negligent. The 
burden was upon the defendant in error to prove 
by competent evidence, direct or circumstantial, 
that the plaintiff in error was guilty of negligence 
in the manufacture or assemblage of the automo-
bile in question. Bowman v. Woodway Stores, 
345 TIL 110, 177 N.E. 727. Testimony concerning 
the condition of cotter pins in the brake mechanism 
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-several weeks after the accident occurred without 
proof that the condition of the pins remained un-
changed was inadmissible and should have been 
excluded. ' ' 
In the case at bar the evidence of plaintiff herself 
was that the condition of the wheel after the accident 
was entirely different from what it was before the 
accident. 
Harward v. General Motors Corporation, et al., 
( 1952), 68 S.E. ( 2) 855. This was a case filed against 
defendant in which it was claimed that the defendant 
was liable for manufacture of a Chevrolet automobile 
by reason of claimed negligence with reference to a 
steering gear. The facts were somewhat similar to those 
in the case at bar. The driver was operating the car 
along a highway and had just emerged from a curve at 
a speed of 50-55 miles per hour when all at once the car 
began to shimmy just a little, something it had never 
done before. The driver touched the brake, something 
popped which sounded like he had hit a coca cola bottle, 
the car went out of control, ran off the road and turned 
completely over and headed back toward the highway. 
In sustaining a judgment for the defendant, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina used the following language 
which is applicable to the case at bar: 
''Negligence is never presumed from the mere 
fact of an accident or injury. The plaintiff has the 
burden of establishing by appropriate proof not 
only negligence but that such negligence was the 
proximate cause of the injury complained of. The 
plaintiff must also establish by his evidence a 
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causal relation between the alleged negligence and 
the injury upon which a recovery is sought. Evi-
dence that merely takes the matter into the realm 
of conjecture is insufficient. Rountree v. Foun-
tain, 203 N.C. 381, 166 S.E. 329; Lynch v. Tele-
phone Co., ~04 N.C. 252, 167 S.E. 847. Plaintiff's 
evidence at most raises a suspicion of conjecture, 
but fails to establish actionable negligence or any 
causal relation between the condition of the auto-
mobile, when it was purchased and the accident 
resulting in plaintiff's injury more than nine 
months later." 
65 C.J.S. 985, Section 220(1), Negligence: 
''As discussed supra Sec. 204, it is a general rule 
that negligence on the part of defendant is never 
presumed but is a matter of affirmative proof; 
hence, in the absence of special circumstances suf-
ficient to bring into operation the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, discussed infra Sees. 220(2)-
220(11), the mere happening of an accident or 
occurrence of an injury does not raise a presump-
tion or authorize an inference of negligence on the 
part of defendant and does not warrant a verdict 
in favor of the injured party." 
To some degree a similar situation in principle 
existed in the much-discussed case of Tuttle vs. Pacific 
Intermountain Express Co., ·----- Utah ______ , 242 Pac. 2d 
764. In that case the Tuttle car was struck in the middle 
of the left-hand side by the front of the tractor-trailer. 
This could have happened in either one of two ways, 
one consistent with plaintiff's theory and the other with 
defendant's. This court said: 
''So the fact that the Tuttle car was struck on 
the left-hand side does not prove either plaintiff's 
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theory or defendant's theory of how the accident 
occurred.'' 
So in this case the fact of separation was no evidence 
as to its condition at the time of sale or as to the cause 
of the separation. That is what the trial court said in 
its instruction. 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
Tuttle case agree that after the ''presumptive fact'' 
was dissipated the parties were left to their other evi-
dence. That is what occurred in this case. The trial 
court simply said there was no inference or presumption 
from the fact of separation. 
In fact, although it was not requested by defendant, 
the ''presumptive fact'' in the case at bar, on the basis 
of Beverly Hooper's evidence that the wheel was good 
and in good condition up to the time of the departure 
of Mrs. Hooper from the ranch on the night of the acci-
dent, was that the wheel was good. That was in line 
with both opinions in the Tuttle case. If the evidence 
of Mr. Curtis was sufficient to place on defendant the 
burden of going forward with its evidence, this was done 
and the jury found for defendant. The fact of separation 
·was no evidence as to the cause of separation or as to the 
condition of the wheel when sold. All the facts were in 
evidence and the most was made of them by plaintiff 
throughout the case. 
In addition to the foregoing authorities we respect-
fully call attention of the court to the following decided 
cases to the same effect : 
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Gibbs Y. General Motors Corp., 350 Mo. 431, 166 
s.w. 2d 242. 
Holgate Ys. Chrysler Corp., 279 Mich. 24, 271 
N.\Y. 539. 
Ayers vs. Amatucci (Okla. 1952), 243 Pac. 2d 243. 
Honea vs. City Dairy (Cal.), 140 Pac. 2d 369. 
Inferences may be indulged that a fact or condition 
once established continues to exist. But even as to this 
there are limitations, and when it appears in the evi-
denc€ that a change has occurred, or that the condition 
is such as is likely to change, the inference disappears 
as having evidentiary value. 
Only in very rare cases does the rule apply to past 
facts or conditions and should never be considered when 
the evidence shows that there has been an intervening 
change. Even where there is an inference it may be 
rebutted. In this case the accident itself destroyed any 
inference of the past condition even though the law were 
to permit such an inference, which it does not. 
The rule is well stated in 31 C.J.S. Sec. 140 under 
Evidence, as follows: 
''As a general rule mere proof of the existence 
of a present condition or state of facts or proof 
of the existence of a condition or state of facts 
at a given time, does not raise any presumption 
that the same condition or facts existed at a prior 
date, since inferences or presumptions of fact 
ordinarily do not run backward.'' 
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-Also Dean Wigmore states the principle in Wigmore 
on Evidence, 2nd Ed. Sec. 437 as follows: 
"When the existence of an object, condition, 
quality, or tendency at a given time is in issue, the 
prior existence of it is in human experience some 
indication of its probable persistence or continu-
ance at a later period. The degree of probability 
of this continuance depends on the chances of in-
tervening circumstances having occurred to bring 
the existence to an end. The possibility of such cir-
cumstances will depend almost entirely on the 
nature of the specific thing whose existence is in 
issue and the particular circumstances affecting 
it in the case in hand. That a soap-bubble was in 
existence half-an-hour ago affords no inference at 
all that it is in existence now; that Mt. Everest 
was in existence ten years ago is strong evidence 
that it exists yet; whether the fact of a tree's 
existence a year ago will indicate its continued 
existence today will vary according to the nature 
of the tree and the conditions of life in the region. 
So far, then, as the interval of time is concerned, 
no fixed rule can be laid down; the nature of the 
thing and the circumstances of the particular case 
must control. 
''Similar considerations affect the use of subse-
quent existence as evidence of existence at the 
time in issue. Here the disturbing contingency is 
that some circumstance operating in the interval 
may have been the source of the subsequent 
existence, and the propriety of the inference will 
depend on the likelihood of such intervening cir-
cumstances having occurred and been the true 
origin.'' 
See also 20 Am. Jur. 208, Sec. 210, Evidence. 
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Thi~ Court in JL'll~l'll Y~. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 
57 Pac. (:2) 708, speaking through l\lr. Justiee Wolfe 
announced the principle in the following words: 
''Certainly where a condition has existed for a 
considerable length of time so as to give way to 
the slow play of natural forces, or where inter-
Yening agencies not natural forces may effect a 
change, no inference that the initial state was 
insecure or unstable can be inferred from the 
later state." 
In this case plaintiff, herself, produced her son as 
her principal witness, who testified that immediately 
prior to the accident the condition of the wheel was good. 
(R. 67). How could the fact of separation after the 
accident constitute any evidence, by inference or other-
wise, as to the condition of the wheel when manufactured' 
The obvious answer is that it couldn't. We reiterate it 
is self -evident. 
In fact the inference should have been exactly the 
opposite from that for which they are contending, if 
there was any inference at all. In negligence cases where 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply there 
is no inference or presumption of negligence. However, 
when plaintiff established the fact by her witnesses that 
the wheel was in good condition immediately before she 
started on the trip, there could have been an inference, 
under the doctrine, that a condition once established is 
presumed to continue, that the wheel was good up to 
the time of the accident. If there was any inference to 
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be drawn it was in our favor-not theirs-and they 
cannot complain. 
The cases cited by counsel for plaintiff are not to 
the contrary and announce no rule which made the in-
struction as to the fact of separation inapplicable to 
the evidence in this case, viz., as to the condition of the 
tire and rim when put on the truck and as to the cause 
of separation. 
In this case the trial court did not reject any evidence 
offered by plaintiff which was germaine to the issue. 
That the spider and rim were separated after the acci-
dent was in evidence. No one gave direct evidence as to 
when they separated. Mr. Curtis gave his opinion that 
they separated before the accident. How long before 
he did not say excepting that it was his opinion that 
it was immediately before. He also expressed his opinion 
that the rivets were loose before the accident but he 
did not say how long. This is a far cry from the evidence 
in the leading case of McPherson vs. Buick Motor Co., 
111 N. E. 1050, where an expert testified that the defect 
was in the wheel when it was manufactured and that a 
proper inspection should have discovered it. It is very 
doubtful if plaintiff made a case for submission to the 
jury in this case. 
We call attention of the Court to the following 
questions propounded to Mr. Curtis on cross-examination 
and his answers thereto (R. 236-237): 
"Q. Is it possible that rivets 1, 2, and 3 could 
have sheared off~ 
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A. It is possible. 
Q. And what about riYet 41 Do you have any 
explanation of why that one remains, or at least 
part of it? 
A. \Yell, if it were never properly seated in the 
hole it would be in the position it is now and the 
-wearing we see would be just on the shank of the 
riYet after the other portion of the rivet had 
sheared. 
Q. You say you think a portion of that rivet 
sheared, too! 
A. Well, the other portion of the rivet is missing 
and whether it failed by tension or shear, or some 
other force, the present rivet there, No. 4, is in the 
hole still and also shiny. Part of it is. 
Q. All right, you say rivets 1, 2, 3, and 4 might 
have sheared off, is that correct~ 
A. They might have. Yes sir, that's correct. 
Q. Did you give any consideration, Mr. Curtis, to 
the fact that the indentation on the outside of 
Exhibit B is in the immediate area of rivets 1, 
2, 3, and 41 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did that mean anything to you at all! 
A. In what respect~ 
Q. You say you gave consideration to it~ Did 
that help you at all with-
A. Well, my thought on it was that it was due to 
the wearing position of those rivets that the blow 
of that magnitude evidently could have happened 
at the overturning of the truck. 
Q. However-
A. Whether it is coincidental or not I wouldn't 
say. 
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-Q. However, you didn't attach it to the fact that 
rivets 1, 2, 3, and 4 might have been sheared off, 
that damage~ 
A. Due to that deformation there~ 
Q. Yes, sir~ 
A. Yes, I did. • 
Q. And could whatever force caused that deforma-
tion have caused a shearing effect on those rivets~ 
A. It could have. It would have to be, the best 
way to tell would be to make an experimental 
analysis to see what type of blow, or the amount 
of energy required to deform this and you could 
easily calculate the value of the three or four 
rivets in question and see if that blow would cause 
a shear.'' 
That is where his opinion was left on cross-exami-
nation. It could have been loose rivets as he testified on 
direct examination or it could have been that the rivets 
in holes 1, 2 and 3 sheared in the accident by reason of 
the blow that caused the dent in the rim and distortion 
to the rim and spider. He was the only witness for 
plaintiff who testified on this subject and there his testi-
mony rested. 
It seems to us that under the doctrine of Sumption 
vs. Streator Smith, 103 Utah 44, 132 Pac. 2d 680, and 
the long line of decisions deferred to therein, that no 
cause for the jury was presented. 
Defendant, in its case, supplied the experimental 
analysis that Mr. Curtis said would be conclusive on that 
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question. See the eYidence of Mr. Arthur Harris ( R. 
355-361). 
The trial court did not say in its instruction that 
no inferences could be drawn from the condition of the 
truck after the accident, including the condition of the 
wheel. It said the fact of separation was no evidence as 
to its prior condition or the cause of separation. 
In the case of Kelly vs. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 
:3~1, 1:25 ~\.tl. 78:2 cited by appellant, there were '''itnesses 
who testified that the condition of the steering gear after 
the accident was the same as before the accident. In 
this case the opposite is true. 
The case of Rotche vs. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 527, 
193 N. E. 529 is against plaintiff's contention here. 
In Hupp Motor Co. vs. Wadsworth, 113 F. (2) 827 
there was much more evidence than indicated by plain-
tiff. The evidence indicated there never had been a 
cotter pin properly inserted in the hole, if inserted at all; 
and expert witnesses so testified. The court did not hold 
that the condition spoke for itself or was evidence of 
itself as to its prior condition. The court did make one 
remark, however, which has bearing on the case. Appel-
lant contended a tire blew out which caused the accident. 
A flat tire was on the car after the accident. The court 
said: 
"The fact that a tire was deflated when the car 
was found in the field does not show that it was 
deflated prior to the accident.'' 
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-This is exactly the principle that the court applied 
in its instruction to the jury in the case at bar. 
General Motors Corp. vs. Johnson, 137 F. (2) 320 
is relied on very heavily by appellant. Of course, the 
entire record in that case is not set forth. It evidently 
was a case for the jury as to faulty construction, if the 
case is correctly reported. The crux of the case was that 
in order to create a correct union between the axle 
housing and the transmission housing there was supposed 
to be a press-fit of the axle housing into the sleeve or 
an opening in the bell or transmission housing. To 
accomplish this press-fit the axle housing should have 
been larger in diameter than the sleeve opening in the 
transmission housing. This is similar to the method by 
which the rim and the spider are united in the case at 
bar excepting that we have four sets of rivets additional 
plus the cone of the rivet holes. After the accident it 
was found that the prescribed condition did not exist. 
The two connections fitted loosely and upon measuring 
were found to have a play of .0011". Witnesses testified 
that this caused the failure. The court said this made 
a case for the jury. So did the trial court in the case at 
bar. No doctrine is announced that aids us in considering 
the propriety of the instruction in this case where it 
was admitted the accident had changed the condition 
of the wheel and the fact of separation could have no 
probative value in determining the cause or prior con-
dition. Independent evidence had to be produced to 
supply that evidence and the trial court held that there 
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was, but the jury did not accept it. In the Johnson case 
they did. That is the difference. 
The other cases cited giYe no aid in determining the 
question here presented for review. Appellant was per-
mitted to fully introduce her evidence as to the condi-
tion of the truck and wheel after the accident. She was 
not permitted to have such facts prove what they did 
not prove, namely the condition at the time of sale or 
the cause of the tip-over. Unless the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur applies, those facts had to be established 
by independent evidence. There was no inference to be 
had from the fact of separation. That is what the 
instruction said. In and of itself the fact of separation 
did not constitute evidence of these issues. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court did not 
err in its instruction and plaintiff was not prejudiced 
in her trial. 
POINT 2. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PER-
MITTING MR. ARTHUR HARRIS TO GIVE HIS 
OPINION AS TO WHAT CAUSED THE SPIDER 
AND RIM TO SEPARATE. 
Appellant incorrectly states that the cause of 
separation of the spider and rim was the ultimate fact 
in issue. The ultimate fact in issue was the condition 
of the spider and rim at the time of sale of the truck 
to Hyland Motor Company by defendant, viz., whether 
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-there was a defect at that time and if so whether it was 
such that by ordinary inspection defendant should have 
discovered it. The cause of separation at the time of 
the accident was an issue of fact to be determined in 
arriving at the condition of the truck immediately before 
the accident. 
Cause and effect have long been the subject of 
expert evidence in the field of technical or scientific 
knowledge. 
Defendant was not at the scene of the accident; had 
no representative there to study the case; never heard 
of the accident until the suit was filed over two months 
after the accident. It had to gather its facts from wit-
nesses who knew something of what conditions were as 
evidenced by marks on the highway and the physical 
condition of the truck as analy~ed by experts. We have 
long since learned that not only in the field of scientific 
research, but also in the ordinary events of life the 
tracks we make and the physical facts speak louder 
than words and very often speak so much louder than 
words that they destroy the word of the lone participant 
in the event. Such was the case here. 
No question is raised as to the qualification of Mr. 
Arthur Harris to express an opinion or as to the facts 
upon the basis of which he was asked to express the 
opinion. Both of these factors were fully developed as 
a preliminary to the question. 
Counsel for appellant takes exception, however, to 
the form of the question. They state that he should 
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have been asked what "might" or "could" have caused 
the separation instead of his opinion as to what "was" 
the cause or "did" cause the particular condition. This 
is at best a mere play on words, technical in the extreme 
and an obvious effort to find some method of setting 
aside the verdict of the jury. 
They are in error in their conception of the history 
of the law of evidence as applied to this subject and the 
decided cases are not with their views. 
Originally experts, when speaking of cause and 
effect, could only express an opinion as to what in their 
opinion did actually cause the condition. The courts 
refused to permit them to testify as . to what ''might'' 
or "could have" caused it, because it was felt that such 
evidence entered the field of speculation. Finally they 
permitted opinion evidence as to what "probably" did 
occur, and finally, in order to further broaden the field, 
permitted the expert to state what "might" or "could" 
have caused the condition upon the theory that it con-
stituted some evidence on the subject and the weight 
of it was for the jury. 
This subject matter is discussed by Dean Wigmore 
in Sec. 1976, Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd Ed., Page 198 
in the following language: 
"Probability and Possibility; Capacity and Ten-
dency; Cause and Effect. A large class of cases, 
embracing statements as to the probability or the 
possibility of an event, the capacity or tendency 
of an act or a machine, the cause or the effect of 
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.. 
a fact, may fairly be grouped together, because 
the reason why the Opinion rule is urged against 
them is in general that the thing to which the wit-
ness testified is not anything which he has ob-
served, but is a quantity which lies in estimate 
only and is the result of a balancing of concrete 
data. This is no sufficient reason for excluding 
such statements; because it must almost always 
be impossible for a witness to reproduce in words 
absolutely all the detailed data which enter into 
his estimate, and there can be no dwnger in re-
ceiving such an estimate from a competent wit-
ness. All that can be said of the rulings is that 
probably some of them, in the final result of the 
litigation in hand, have done less actual harm to 
justice than others have done. 
"It should be added that Courts sometimes mis-
apply the Opinion rule to enforce the doctrine of 
Torts that a recovery for future personal injuries 
must include only the certain or fairly probable, 
but not the merely possible, consequences; so that 
the judge instead of covering the subject by an 
instruction to the jury as to the measure of re-
covery, excludes from evidence a physician's 
opinion expressed in terms of possibility only. 
This attempt to control the course of expert tes-
timony is of course unreasonable in itself. But 
its unsoundness becomes the more notable when 
the same Court is found ruling, in another line 
of precedents, that the physician may express an 
opinion as to what might have caused an injury, 
but not as to what did cause it. In other words, 
possibility, as affecting consequences, is tabooed, 
and only actuality is to be accepted; but pos-
sibility, as affecting causes, is sanctioned, while 
actuality is tabooed ... 
''This is only one of the many instances in which 
the subtle mental twistings produced by the 
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Opinion rule have reduced this part of the law to 
a congeries of non-sense which is comparable to 
the incantations of medieval sorcerers and sullies 
the name of Reason.'' 
See also the following: 
20 Am. Jur. 686, Sec. 817, Evidence. 
32 C. J. S. Sec. 494, Evidence. 
Grismore vs. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 
328, 5 N.W. (2) 646. 
Schweiger vs. Solbeck, ____ Ore. ____ , 230 Pac. (2) 195. 
Empire St. Ins. Uo. vs. Guerriero, 69 Atl. ( 2) 259. 
Shepherd vs. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio 
St. 6, 87 N.E. (2) 156. 
A question similar in principle was before this court 
in Baker vs. Wycoff, 95 Ut. 199, 79 Pac. (2) 77, wherein 
the medical experts were asked the direct question as to 
the proper diagnosis under certain given facts. A simi-
lar objection was made that such question invaded the 
province of the jury in determining the ultimate fact. 
This court said the question was proper. 
Generally the courts have followed the rule an-
nounced by Dean Wigmore and it certainly is sound law. 
In fact, this Court in Jackson vs. Harries, 65 U t. 
282, 236 Pac. 234, in approving the asking of a question 
as to what "could" be the cause of a condition discussed 
the general subject in almost identical terms to what 
Dean Wigmore used. We quote as follows : 
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"The objection is that they call for testimony 
which is immaterial and incompetent. The argu-
ment is made that the experts are called because 
they are supposed to be competent to express an 
opinion, having probative value, as to the real 
cause of the plaintiff's condition; and that, to 
support the charge that defendants are responsible 
for that condition, the expert opinion should be 
addressed to the conclusion as to whether or not 
defendants' acts were the cause thereof. If the 
exzJert could not say that in his opinion the acts 
complained of did or did not cause the injury, then 
his testimony was without value, being mere 
speculation and conjecture, and affording no basis 
for an award of damages." 
The court held the qualified opinion was also 
acceptable. The weight was for the jury. 
The fact that an expert may express a qualified 
opinion does not preclude him from expressing his 
opinion in unqualified terms. 
POINT 3. 
THE TESTIMONY OF LOWELL J. FOUTS AS 
TO IDENTITY OF THE TRUCK MARK WAS NOT 
HEARSAY AND NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Mr. Jim Stinnett had testifed to the location of a 
certain track mark in the fill which he said was made 
by the truck. He identified the location with reference 
to a stake or stick in the fill. The location was estab-
lished with reference to a photograph Ex. I, that was in 
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evidence and used by both parties as marking the place 
of the accident and ?\lr. Stinnett's evidence went in with-
out objection. It was a matter of identity of location. 
He said the marks were still there. He showed them to 
~lr. Fouts. He drew the marks on Exhibit 7. Mr. Fouts 
was asked if ~Ir. Stinnett showed him the place of the 
mark that he was testifying to. He answered without 
objection that he did. He testified that he identified the 
mark and place of the accident to llir. Franklin Harris. 
This was not hearsay. It was identifying the same place 
after the evidence as to its being the same place had 
already been put in without objection. Plaintiff and her 
witnesses also identified the same place by reference to 
the photograph. What ~Ir. Fouts, himself, saw at the 
same spot was not hearsay. There was no dispute 
as to the location. All of the witnesses identified it 
with reference to the photograph and the location on 
the highway with reference to physical characteristics 
and surroundings. The evidence was neither hearsay 
nor too remote. It is true that a winter had intervened 
but the mark in the fill was still there and the location 
had been established by witnesses who were present 
immediately following the accident. Similar evidence 
was found to be proper in Courton vs. Benjamin, 305 
Mass. 489, 26 N.E. (2) 354, and Peters vs. Consolidated 
Freight Lines, 157 Or. 605, 73 Pac. (2) 713; Anderson vs. 
Sparks, 142 Wis. 398, 125 N.W. 925. See also Lever 
Bros. vs. Stapleton, 313 Ky. 837, 233 S.W. (2) 1002. 
This goes to the weight of the evidence and is largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. 
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• 
Counsel for appellant says the testimony of Fouts 
was corroborative of the evidence of Stinnett that there 
was such a mark off the highway in the fill. There was 
no dispute on that question. Beverly Hooper, plaintiff's 
son, testified on cross-examination (R. 108) that it was 
there immediately after the accident. He said it was 
made by the truck when it was being pulled up the high-
way after the accident. His evidence in that regard was 
not corroborated by the men who pulled the truck. The 
fact of existence of the mark off the highway in the fill 
was not disputed. 
POINT 4. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
THE OPINION EVIDENCE OF MR. ARTHUR 
HARRIS AS TO WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED 
THE SEPARATION. 
Counsel for plaintiff had cross-examined Mr. Harris 
extensively as to whether there was anything on the 
highway that could have been an object against which 
the wheel could have struck with sufficient force to break 
the rivets (R. 385-390). In doing so he covered the 
highway and used the photographs extensively. How-
~ver, he did not mention the rocks and boulders in the 
fill that show on Exhibit "1 ", nor did he mention the 
tracks off the highway in the fill to which Mr. Stinnett 
had testified. It was upon redirect examination that he 
was asked whether a rock or boulder could have furnished 
that resistance. 
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That is the same type of evidence that counsel says 
was proper for an expert to give in his discussion under 
Point 2. He opened the door to the subject matter by 
going into it with the same witness on cross-examination 
and asking what in his opinion was there which could 
have produced the resistance force to shear the rivets 
and produce the separation. One may not open the door 
to that inquiry and then shut it for the other. 
This type of question falls squarely within the rule 
for which appellants contend as proper in the!r argu-
ment under Point 2. They now say it is improper. See 
Jackson vs. Harries, supra, under Point 2. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH AND ELTON 
By H. A. Rich 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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